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Contextualizing the Economic Basis of Political Support:  
Government Economic Engagement, Economic Perceptions, and Democratic 
Satisfaction 
 
Abstract 
Citizens extend their support to the government based on their evaluation of the 
government’s economic performance.  Yet, inadequate attention has been paid to 
how the economic roles of the government influence the economic basis of 
government support.  We argue that the extent to which the government is engaged 
in the economy determines how people attribute economic success or failure to the 
government and thus moderates the effect of economic perceptions.  Focusing on 
one widely researched measurement of political support in a democratic setting, 
democratic satisfaction, we analyze the moderating effect of government economic 
engagement on the effect of economic perceptions among eighteen Latin American 
democracies.  A consistent finding yielded in our study is that with a higher level of 
economic engagement of the government, there is a stronger association between the 
perceptions of economic conditions and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. 
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Citizens’ evaluation of government outputs, especially economic one, strongly 
influences their attitudes towards both the incumbent government and the overall 
political system (Citrin and Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1998; Hibs, 1982; Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Listhaug, 1995; Lockerbie, 1993; Mishler and Rose, 
2001; Newton, 2006; Przeworski, 1996; Weatherford, 1984; Weatherford, 1987).  In 
particular, it has been widely reported that, people’s satisfaction with democracy, one 
of the most frequently focused indicators of political support, hinges on their 
perception of economic performance (e.g. Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Duch 
1993; Lagos, 2003; Wells and Krieckhaus 2006; Linde and Erlingsson 2013; Lühiste 
2014; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013; Campbell 2015; Magalhaes, 2016).  The 
link between citizens’ economic perception and political support (as measured in 
various ways), however, has also been proven by many studies as neither clear-cut 
nor direct.  Instead, it is moderated by individual attributes, such as political 
ideology, partisanship, and winner/loser positions (Evans and Anderson, 2006; Tilley 
and Hobolt, 2011), and institutional factors such as the concentration of political 
power and the coalition status of the ruling government (Anderson, 2007; Powell and 
Whiten, 1993).  Some studies further suggest the role of politicians as strategic 
players in moderating the effect of economic performance on political support 
(Hellwig, 2012).  Politicians can adjust policy positions in response to economic 
conditions to shape how voters attribute responsibility and evaluate elites.  
Magalhaes’ (2016) recent study shows that the effect of economic perception on 
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individuals’ satisfaction with democracy is determined by perceived procedural 
justice. 
 Among the factors examined in the literature, there is inadequate attention to 
how the relationship between the government and the economy shapes the effect of 
economic perceptions on political support.  We contend that the economic roles of 
government cannot be assumed invariant across countries.  Indeed, government 
engagement in the economy amplifies the political effect of economic evaluations.  
It does so not only by increasing, in both reality and citizens’ perceptions, the 
government’s political responsibilities for economic outcomes, but also by 
reinforcing the instrumental (economic) logic of individuals in formulating their 
attitudes towards the government. 
 To empirically test the moderating effect of government economic engagement 
on the relationship between economic perceptions and political support, we use a 
combined dataset of AmericasBarometer that covers four waves (2006, 2008, 2010, 
and 2012) of national surveys in eighteen countries.  Our multilevel analyses 
consistently show that the positive effect of economic perceptions on democratic 
satisfaction and other commonly used indicators of political support (i.e., presidential 
approval and government performance evaluation) is amplified by a higher level of 
government engagement in the economy.  Moreover, the moderating effect of the 
economic engagement of the government holds when we control for the moderating 
effect of institutional and individual factors in the model. 
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 This research contributes to the literature in two ways.  First, the theoretical 
perspective that we offer extends the scholarship that suggests the contingent effect 
of economic perceptions.  Our argument indicates that, in addition to widely 
suspected individual and institutional moderating factors, the extent of government 
economic engagement constitutes an important macro-level structural factor that 
shapes the political effect of economic perceptions.  Second, this study broadens the 
implications of the economic roles of the state.  The economic implications of the 
various economic roles of the state have been well discussed in the literature 
(Acemoglu, 2005; Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004; Wade, 1990).  Their political 
implications, particularly those for public opinion, however, have received less 
attention.  This study highlights the political implications of the government’s 
economic role by showing that it alters how people perceive the relevance of the 
government to the economy and to what extent economic situations entail political 
consequences. 
 
Contingency of Economic Basis of Political Support 
“Before economic discontents take on political significance, people must either 
believe that the government produced them or that it is the government’s job to 
remedy them” (Peffley, 1985: 192).  Based on this, a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies have identified the factors that influence how citizens link 
economic conditions to the government and, thus, shape the effects of individuals’ 
economic perceptions on their support for the government in general and satisfaction 
  5 
with democracy in particular.  In this regard, two types of factors have been well 
theorized and studied (for two reviews, see Anderson, 2007 and Magalhaes, 2016). 
 The first type of factor occurs at the individual level.  Citizens with different 
socio-psychological attributes, such as motivation, bias, and cognitive abilities, view 
government differently under the same economic conditions.  For instance, 
majority/minority (or winner/loser) status is found to be a significant moderator of 
the effect of economic perceptions on one measurement of political support, 
satisfaction with democracy.  “Winners discount negative information about the 
economy because of their status as supporters of the incumbent government” 
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997: 72).  Partisanship is another important precondition 
that shapes economic perceptions, which, in turn, determines both voting preference 
and political support in general (Rudolph, 2003; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).  When 
the partisan “contamination” of the perception of economic performance is taken into 
account, the effect of economic perceptions is drastically reduced (Evens and 
Anderson, 2006).  Rudolph (2003) developed a comprehensive list of individual 
factors that generate heterogeneous effects of economic perceptions, including 
partisanship, economic ideology, and individuals’ perceptions of institutional context. 
 The second type of factors concerns political institutions.  A key argument in 
this field of study is that the “clarity of responsibility” of political institutions 
determines the extent to which citizens praise or blame the government for economic 
performance (Anderson, 2000; Rudolph, 2003; Becher and Donnelly, 2013; Powell 
and Whitten, 1993).  Complex institutional setups blur the lines of responsibility 
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and allow representatives to escape attention or to shift blame, and institutional 
designs influence how citizens assign responsibility for the government (Anderson, 
2007).  For instance, compared to people in a country where the power of 
policymaking is concentrated in the hands of one party or one institution, those in a 
system with a greater extent of power-sharing are less likely to associate economic 
misfortune with the government (Becher and Donnelly, 2013; Duch and Stevenson, 
2008).  Other factors that potentially can determine the clarity of responsibility and 
the political effect of economic perceptions include the proportion of legislative seats 
held by the largest party (Anderson, 2000), the ideological cohesion of coalitional 
government (Nadeau, 2000), and the political decentralization in the vertical 
dimension (Anderson, 2006).  
 More closely related to our study, Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011) argue that a close 
tie to world markets shifts responsibility towards international actors and makes 
voters to vote less based on the economy.  In this study, we share the same interest 
in the relevance of economic structure to responsibility attribution.  Our study, 
however, differs from theirs and others by providing an explicit account of the 
importance of the relationship between the government and the economy for the 
attribution of economic responsibility and a direct empirical test of the moderating 
effect of domestic political-economic structure.  We believe that how the 
government is related to the economy strongly influences how people perceive the 
economic responsibility of the government and, thus, how they evaluate the 
government in different economic situations. 
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Government Engagement and Economic Basis of Political Support 
Historically, governments around the world have played rather different roles in the 
economy.  The literature on the varieties of capitalism, for instance, has noted that 
advanced industrialized democracies vary substantially with regard to the role of the 
states in their national economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck and Yamamura, 
2003).  They differ, for example, in the extent to which the government deals with 
the capital-labor relationship and provides social welfare.  The governments in 
developing countries are also engaged in the economy to a great, if not greater, 
extent.  They have involved in the economy for different reasons, such as the 
necessity for the state to jump start and protect national enterprises, the heavy 
dependency on natural resources, and the communist legacy of state-run economy 
(Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004; Migdal, 1988; North, 1981; Wade, 1990).  In any case, 
the economic roles of modern states of both developed and developing countries 
cannot be reduced to mere monetary or managerial policies.  Instead, they play 
direct roles in such forms as government public investment, taxation, spending, 
transferring and other activities that are directly related to economic output.  For 
this reason, neither clear-cut separation between the government and the economy 
nor the homogeneity of the economic role of the state can be assumed for countries 
around the world.  
 Although there are historical or natural reasons a government is engaged in the 
economy, as the history of Latin America, the region of interest in this research, has 
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shown the governments have a choice of liberating or intervening (or keeping 
intervening) the economy.  They thus bear variant levels of political responsibility 
for economic conditions across countries depending on how much they are engaged 
in the economy.  Government economic engagement amplifies the political 
consequence of economic output, both in reality and in perception, for two reasons.  
First and foremost, it increases the extent to which citizens assign responsibility to 
governments for economic outcomes.  The strong appearance of government in 
economic activities makes salient the role of the government in the perceptions of the 
public.  Most citizens, as suggested in previous studies, are not sophisticated 
enough to establish a direct connection between economic situations and government 
responsibility (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Anderson, 2007; Lohmann, 1999).  
In particular, institutions such as power-sharing and office-alteration dampen public’s 
dissatisfaction against the government “by institutionalizing opportunities for 
leadership and policy change” (Remmer 1996, 618).  A relative separation between 
the economy and the government further adds to the vagueness of responsibility in 
citizens’ perceptions.  Among the countries where the government’s role is mostly 
indirect, it is more difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to directly connect 
economic outcomes with the government. 
 In contrast, frequent and intensive engagement of the government in assets 
ownership, investment, economic production, and other economic activities clearly 
signals to the public the relevance of the government to economic outcomes.  This 
engagement enables them to identify the responsibility of the government in 
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economic affairs.  Institutions, such as power distribution and office alteration, still 
can blur the responsibilities of specific individuals or organizations and make it 
difficult for the citizens to tell exactly who or which government agencies should be 
responsible for the economic performance.  Nevertheless, such a blurring of 
responsibility might cause the problem of responsibility attribution for citizens only 
when they attempt to blame specific individuals or organizations, not when they 
associate economic conditions with the government en bloc.  Citizens in countries 
who see a more visible government in the economy hold, to a greater extent, the 
government as a whole liable and thus become dissatisfied with the political 
institutions in general if they suffer from economic duress for which they suspect that 
the government has played a critical role. 
 Second, government economic engagement can also reinforce the instrumental 
logic of political support.  As suggested in the literature, citizens’ attitudes towards 
government are shaped by both calculations of material benefits and concerns about 
values and norms (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Easton, 1975; Evans and 
Whitefield, 1995; Finkel, Lipset and Schneider, 1987; Miller 1974; Muller and 
Jukam, 1977; Muller and Seligson, 1989).  The appearance of a strong government 
role in the economy makes a difference by tipping the balance toward material versus 
non-material goods in terms of political support.  That is, people associate, to a 
greater extent, their evaluations of legitimacy with the government’s economic 
performance, as compared to other non-material factors, and their political support is 
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more susceptible to the fluctuations in the economic situation than non-economic 
considerations. 
 This increased importance of economic considerations in forming individuals’ 
political support results not only from their perceptions of government’s economic 
responsibility, but also from the actual connection between their economic interests 
and the government.  The incomes of citizens who live in an economy where the 
government has a strong hand are likely to be influenced by the government’s 
activities during both the ebb and flow of the economy.  As noted in studies of 
developing economies, when the economy is heavily dependent on the government, 
the most important sources of profit are often derived from the collaboration with 
state agencies (Bellin, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005; Remmer, 1999).  
The business elites, for instance, rely on political elites to get preferential 
manufacturing and trade policies, to secure the flow of capital in the form of loans 
and investments, and to obtain other benefits.  The masses also rely, to a great 
extent, on the government-owned or government-invested enterprises for 
employment, salaries and social welfare benefits derived from the returns of state 
businesses.  When the economic well-being improves in such a system of 
patronage, citizens give credit to the government, more than do their counterparts in 
countries where the role of government is minimal. 
 Recognizing the importance of this “pocketbook” mentality, governments, 
particularly in developing democracies, have a tendency to boast about the role of 
government in the economy for political reasons.  The government’s contribution to 
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economic growth helps the government to gain political support from the citizens.  
A common challenge for new democracies in the developing world is the lack of 
robust support for the regime.  Citizens in such countries have limited experience or 
knowledge of democratic structure, operation, and political principles; they have not 
developed a normative commitment to democracy; and political institutions such as 
the rule of law and accountability have not been fully established (Mishler and Rose, 
2001a; Mishler and Rose, 2001b; Rose and Shin, 2001; Svolik, 2013).  To earn 
political support or people’s satisfaction with the newly installed democratic 
institutions in particular, the regimes in those countries often must rely on the 
tangible benefits, especially economic ones, that they can bring to the masses (Boron, 
1993; Mishler and Rose, 2001b; Kitschelt, 1992; Przeworski, 1991). 
 Governments’ deliberate interventions in the economy, however, can rapidly 
deplete popular support during difficult times, and the connection between the 
government and the economy backfires.  When the economy turns bad, the same 
taking of responsibility that has earned the government credit makes it liable for 
economic losses in the public’s perceptions (Joseph, 1997; Tang and Woods, 2014; 
Whitehead, 1993).  This occurs because, during the economic downturns, the 
government has to discontinue preferential treatment, lay off employees, or stop 
delivering social benefits due to the shrinking revenues of the government’s 
investment.  Therefore, a large portion of individuals’ incomes will be lost due to 
the policies and actions of the government.  Moreover, as the holders of public 
assets, politicians and government agencies have the motivation and capacity to 
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protect their privileged income at the expense of the masses.  Government 
economic involvement in new democracies also provides opportunities for politicians 
to engage in rent-seeking and other corruptive behaviors.  This is again, particularly 
true in developing countries, because political institutions in such countries have yet 
to become effective in constraining politicians’ behaviors (Keefer, 2007; Mohtadi 
and Roe, 2003; Weyland, 1998).  As a result, the higher the stake of the government 
in the economy, the greater is the relevance of the government to the economic 
interest of citizens in both perceptions and reality. 
 In essence, the government faces a strategic dilemma of its economic 
intervention.  On the one hand, without a salient role of economic engagement, the 
government cannot creditably claim credits associated with economic growth.  It 
could instead focus on its role in non-economic issues such as social policies and 
political performance (e.g. anti-corruption).  However, for developing democracies 
that are usually plagued with social and political problems, an active role in a fast 
growing economy can be an attractive option for the government to obtain political 
support, more so than it can obtain from state-free economic growth .  On the other 
hand, however, economic growth cannot be guaranteed, with or without government 
engagement.  A greater role is accompanied with a greater responsibility.  High 
levels of state engagement alleviate the problem of responsibility attribution for the 
public and make the ruling regime more likely to be punished during economic 
downturn.  A government, thus, has to decide on an optimal level of economic 
engagement for its political benefits.  
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 In sum, we have the key hypothesis of this study:  
 Hypothesis 1:  When there is a higher level of state engagement in the 
economy, the magnitude of the positive effect of economic perception on democratic 
satisfaction is greater. 
 
Data and Measurement 
To test the conditional effects of economic perceptions on political support, we use 
the dataset of AmericasBarometer (2006–2012).  We chose this dataset for several 
reasons.  First, AmericasBarometer is one of the few datasets that contain the 
information necessary for our analysis.  It has questions about the evaluation of 
national and individual economic conditions and political support (including 
democratic satisfaction).  Most importantly, it contains information of whether 
respondents voted for the incumbent government, an important factor that may 
contaminate political support, especially satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and 
Tverdova, 1997; Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012).  Second, AmericasBarometer 
enables us to identify winner/loser status in a more consistent way than do other 
cross-national surveys that contain such information.  One complication in coding 
winner/loser status is the varying constitutional designs and electoral systems.  One 
advantage of using AmericasBarometer is that it contains eighteen Latin American 
countries with the same presidential system.  We limit our sample to those eighteen 
countries and identify the winner of elections in the same sense across countries, that 
is, whether the respondent voted for the incumbent president.  Third, the 
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AmericasBarometer has conducted multiple waves of surveys with the same survey 
instruments and identical questions, and four of them (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) 
contain all the necessary information for our analysis.  Multiple waves of surveys 
provide a large number of units of analysis at the aggregate level (sixty-four country-
wave units in total), which leads to an adequate number of degrees of freedom in our 
multilevel analysis.  The summary statistics of all the variables used in this study 
are reported in Appendix 1. 
 More substantively, Latin America offers an appropriate context to test the 
conditional effect of state economic engagement on the relationship between 
economic perceptions and government support.  For one thing, economic 
consideration has been salient in forming people’s political attitudes, including both 
specific support for the government and general support for political system and 
democracy as a whole, in Latin America. (Alcañiz and Hellwig 2011, 396; Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2013).  Among other problems, new democracies Latin 
American countries have particularly been faced with dual challenge of a relatively 
slow economic growth and a dire public perception of it among their citizens after 
the turn of the century (Alcañiz and Hellwig 2011, 396).  For instance, in the 
sample we choose, only 15% respondents evaluate their country’s economy as 
“good” or “very good;” and 18% respondents think the national economy has 
become “better.”  A reinvestigation about the political effect of economic 
perceptions can shed light on the stability of the government and the consolidation of 
democracy in the region. 
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 For another, the economic roles of the governments in Latin America varies 
greatly.  Since the end of World War II, Latin American countries have adopted 
different economic policies.  Most of them first adopted imported-substitution 
industrialization with a strong state intervention for the first several decades, and 
many of them have then moved to economic liberalization and trade liberalization 
since 1980s.  Due to the history of both types of macro-economic policies and the 
divergence in the timing and depth of economic reforms undertaken in different 
countries, there exists a wide variation in the extent of state engagement in the 
economy across the region.  For example, in our sample, public investment 
accounts for about 10% of total investment in the economy on average in Chile and 
Argentina and about 45% in Venezuela and 55% in Bolivia.  Such a wide variation 
provides us an ideal sample to test how people would attribute the national and 
personal economic wellbeing to the government under different economic structure. 
 
Political support 
Political support is a multi-dimensioned concept (Easton 1965; Norris 1999).  We in 
this study thus use different measurements to avoid bias.  Among different ones, our 
main analyses focus on one of the most commonly used indicator, individuals’ 
satisfaction with democracy.  In AmericasBarometer, respondents indicate their 
satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country on a scale of 1 (very 
satisfied) to 4 (very dissatisfied).  We recode the scale such that a higher value 
indicates a higher level of political support. 
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 Democratic satisfaction is certainly not specific support (support for particular 
institutions or figures, especially the incumbents) in Easton (1965)’s conventional 
typology.  It is a dimension of political support at the regime level.  Among the 
three objects of support at the regime level in Norris (1999)’s refined typological 
framework (regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions), 
democratic satisfaction is a short-term evaluation of the performance output of the 
political system (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012, p.244).  It taps “how democracy 
functions in practice as opposed to the ideal” (Norris 1999, p. 11).  Therefore, it is 
an expression of general support for the current political system in place.  It should 
be noted that democratic satisfaction should not be confused with another major 
concept of political support, “support for democracy.”  A person who is dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works in practice in his/her country does not necessarily 
mean that he or she does not support democracy as a fundamental principle of the 
political regime (Lühiste 2014). 
 We focus on democratic satisfaction as our main measurement of political 
support mostly because the object of support in this measurement more closely 
corresponds to our theory.  On one hand, we do not want to focus on one particular 
government office, either administrative offices or the legislative bodies.  As 
pointed out in the literature and explained in our theoretical section, ordinary citizens 
cannot really tell which government institution exactly should be responsible for 
economic performance.  For instance, it might be the presidential office, a 
legislative branch, or other non-elected institution that has made a particular decision 
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to increase government’s engagement in the economy in a certain area.  However, 
citizens can hold the whole government as accountable for output and thus become 
dissatisfied with the performance of political regime if they suspect its responsibility 
for economic failures.  On the other hand, we do not intend to go as far as to claim 
that economic misfortune and its connection with the  government will further make 
people to abandon democratic principles on which Latin American democratic states 
are built.  Instead of replacing the democratic system with an authoritarian one, a 
dissatisfied person could opt for another government or another type of economic 
policies that is embraced by a particular party. 
We choose democratic satisfaction also because of the salient status of this 
concept and measurement in the literature (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2003; 
Luhiste, 2013; Newton, 2006; Luigi, Jou and Memoli, 2012; Magalhaes, 2016, 
Waldron-Moore, Pamela, 1999).  Democratic satisfaction has become one of the 
most used and well-researched indicator of political support. Therefore, using 
democratic satisfaction as the main measurement helps our study to speak a 
consistent body of literature. Especially, many studies of democratic satisfaction and 
its economic basis have been done in different regions.  Focusing on a particular 
government institution runs into the problem of variant constitutional frameworks 
among different regions and different countries.  An abstract and system-level 
measurement of support can bridge the understanding of the economic basis of 
political support across different contexts. The question of democratic satisfaction 
has been included in many of cross-national surveys. 
Commented [a1]: Can you give one or two examples for each 
region? 
Commented [NH2]: Add something new if possible 
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One opposition 
 Although we focus on satisfaction with democracy, we check the robustness of 
our findings using alternative measurements of political support.  We first create an 
index of specific support (on the scale from 0 to 10) by summing and recoding the 
responses to four questions that asks respondents to evaluate the performance of the 
current administration.1  The four items have a high level of consistency, with 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89.  We further rely on the information of a question that 
directly asked one’s evaluation of the performance of the incumbent president in his 
or her country.2  Together, these three measurements can effectively capture one’s 
level of political support at different dimensions.  
 
Economic Perceptions 
In the literature, scholars have used various measurements of economic perceptions 
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Becher and Donnelly, 2013; Evans and Anderson, 
                                                             
1 The four questions are: “To what extent would you say the current administration 
fights poverty?” “To what extent would you say the current administration promotes 
and protects democratic principles?” “To what extent would you say the current 
administration combats government corruption?” “To what extent would you say the 
current administration improves citizen safety?” 
2 The question reads: “Speaking in general of the current administration, how would 
you rate the job performance of President X?” 
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2006).  For instance, they distinguish between sociotropic evaluation (evaluation of 
the national economy) and egocentric evaluation (evaluation of the personal 
economy).  They also differentiate between the evaluation of the past (retrospective) 
economic situation and that of present situation.  In our main analyses, we measure 
economic perceptions by using the responses to the question that asks the 
respondents’ retrospective evaluation of the country’s economic situation.  In 
additional analyses, we also use the present evaluation and egocentric evaluation of 
economic situation to check the robustness of our findings. 
 
Economic Engagement of the Government 
To measure the extent to which the government is engaged in the economy, we rely 
on the data provided by Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the World (EFW).  
EFW contains a composite index that indicates the extent of government economic 
engagement (“size of government”).  This index is created based on four indicators 
of the economic roles of the government: “government enterprises and investment,” 
“government consumption,” “government transfers and subsidies,” and “top marginal 
tax rate.”  On the original scale of 0-10, a higher score denotes a higher level of 
economic freedom and hence a lower level of state engagement in the economy.  
For a better interpretation and comparison, we recode and reverse it to a scale of 0-10 
such that a higher score indicates a higher level of state engagement.  Figure 1 
presents government engagement across Latin American countries over the four 
waves of survey (with some waves missing a few countries). 
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[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
It shows that, first, there is a large variation across countries.  For example, 
Colombia and Venezuela have the highest level of state engagement in the economy 
on average among all countries.  In countries such as Costa Rica, Dominica, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, the government has relatively been passive in meddling 
with the economy.  Second, while the level of state engagement stays relatively 
stable in many countries (e.g. Dominica, Guatemala, and Peru), there also is a 
meaningful variation over years in some countries and a drastic fluctuation in a few 
of them.  Colombia, for instance, has experienced a significant and steady decrease 
in government involvement in the economy, while the governments in Ecuador and 
Panama have greatly increased its presence in the economy.  However, generally 
speaking, the variation of government engagement exists mostly across countries. 
 We use this summary index as the measurement of government economic 
engagement in main analyses. In a set of robustness-check analyses, we also use each 
of the four component indicators separately (government investment as a share of 
total investment, government consumption as a proportion of total consumption, 
general government transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP, and top marginal 
income tax rate). We do so because presumably these different aspects of economic 
engagement of the state could have different effects on the relationship of concern. 
As shown in Appendix 2 (A-D), Latin American countries vary greatly in all these 
four aspects of government engagement. 
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 The governments around the world have been engaged in the economy in 
numerous ways, and we thus do not intend to capture all aspects of government 
intervention in this study.  We believe that this composite index and its component 
indicators constitute a good measurement of government economic engagement in 
our conception.  Public ownership and investment are the most important ways 
through which the government directly participates in economic production.  
Government consumption spending measures the involvement of governments in 
providing goods and services for the direct material needs of the population.  
Income tax rate and transfer are the standard approaches the government uses to 
finance public spending and redistribute wealth.  The “size of government” index 
and its indicators of have already been used in the literature to measure the economic 
engagement of the government in the economy (Tang et al. 2017; Tang and Woods 
2014). 
Moreover, the measurement we use focuses on the most direct and visible 
aspects of government roles in the economy and thus well correspond to our theory.  
We would like a measurement of government economic engagement that can most 
directly signal to the public the responsibility of the government.  The economic 
activities included in this study are the ones that clearly demonstrate to the general 
public how much the government meddles in the economy and the extent to which 
economic well-being is connected with the government.  For instance, the number 
of state owned enterprises and the amount of government’s public investment 
directly generates employment opportunities, and thus an increase of unemployment 
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from the public sectors during economic downturns can augments the responsibility 
of the government.  An increase of income tax rate can also make the citizens more 
likely feel the financial stress during economic duress and thus attribute the 
responsibility to the government.  We acknowledge that our measurement is not 
comprehensive.  It does not include such relevant aspects as strategic planning, 
operational support, absorbing foreign investment, and regulating business activities.  
The index we use and its four components of government economic roles are 
objective aspects that are less problematic for measurement than are other 
dimensions.  In fact, no studies have compiled or used the data of other dimensions 
of government engagement. 
 
Other Variables 
Following the extant literature, we include a set of variables at the individual level: 
female (0 for male, 1 for female), age (in years), education levels (in years), and 
urban residence (0 for rural, 1 for urban).  Most importantly, we control for the 
effect of the winner/loser status of respondents. We obtain this variable by coding 
their responses to the question about for whom they voted in the most recent 
presidential elections (1 for voters of the incumbent presidents, 0 for others). 
At the country level, we include economic growth, measured as the growth rate 
of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the level of perceived government 
corruption, measured as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  Moreover, given 
the widely suspected moderating effect of political institutions on the relationship 
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between economic perceptions and political support, we include a variable at the 
country level that captures the concentration of political power, an indicator of the 
clarity of responsibility.  This variable concerns whether the governing party of the 
chief executive office in a country also controls legislative bodies. The data are 
obtained from the Database of Political Institutions.  In addition, we include a 
variable of federalism to control for the effect of clarity of responsibility at the 
vertical dimension.  Finally, since Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011) have pointed out the 
potential influence of dependence on the world economy for responsibility 
attribution, we include a composite indicator from EFW, “freedom to trade 
internationally.”  This indicator ranks countries on a scale from 0 to 10 based on 
various aspects of trade including “taxes on international trade,” “regulatory trade 
barriers,” “international capital market controls,” and others. 
 
Analyses and Results 
Model choice 
In our data, individuals are nested in countries, and each country has four waves of 
surveys.  Therefore, a multilevel model is appropriate for our analysis.  Given the 
data structure, a three-level model might be appropriate (individual-country-wave).  
However, we choose not to include a separate level for time (wave). Instead, we 
combine the country level and wave level and use a two-level model in our main 
analyses.  The first level is individual, and the second level is “country-wave.” We 
do this for two reasons.  First, the number of the units of the two aggregate levels, 
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especially at the level “wave,” is limited (18 for countries, 4 for waves).  It is not 
adequate to conduct statistical analysis either for a single wave of countries (18 
cases) or for a separate level of “wave” in addition to “country” (See a recent 
discussion by Stegmueller 2013).  This is especially a problem in this study since 
we include a number of necessary variables (as many as six variables) at the 
aggregate level and an interaction term between an aggregate variable and an 
individual variable.  Second, as shown in Figure 1, the greatest variation of the key 
variable of theoretical interest, government economic engagement, exists across 
countries although we do see a meaningful variation over time in a few countries.  
We therefore do not model time-varying effect of government engagement although 
we have four waves of data, but treat each country-wave as a cross-section unit (61 
aggregate units in total).  Because the primary dependent variable, democratic 
satisfaction, is on a four-point ordinal scale, we employ a two-level ordered logistic 
model for analysis.  
The analysis of a null model with only intercepts shows that intra-class 
correlation (ICC) is 0.07, meaning that 7% of the total variance comes from the 
second level (i.e., country-wave).  This percentage is relatively small, but it is 
understandable and acceptable.  The survey was conducted at the individual level, 
and the number of individuals surveyed is as many as 10 thousands, but that of the 
country-waves is as few as 64.  As claimed by Steenbergen and Jones (2002), 
positive ICCs have the potential of biasing statistical inferences if we ignore the 
multilevel nature of data structure.  For instance, even an ICC of 0.01 can produce a 
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Type I error rate of 0.17 (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 220).  Moreover, the 
variance component at the aggregate level (country-wave) in all of our models are 
statistically significant.  The use of a multilevel model is thus necessary. 
To deal with potential problems associated with the empirical strategy of using 
country-wave as the second-level unit, we employ several means.  First, since for 
each wave of surveys there might be time-specific unobserved effects, we include 
wave dummies in all of our analyses.  Second, in one analysis, we only include one 
wave of countries (18 countries).  Both approaches check the robustness of our 
findings against the potential suspicion that a large number of aggregate units might 
inflate the significance of coefficients.  Lastly, another robust analysis fits a three-
level model (individual, country, and wave). 
 
Main Analysis 
In Table 1, we present the results of our main analyses of democratic satisfaction.3  
Model 1 is the baseline model in which we included an interaction term between 
economic perceptions (retrospective evaluation of the national economy) and the 
composite index of government economic engagement (size of government).  The 
analysis shows that, first, a positive economic perception is associated with a higher 
                                                             
3 The results of the null model and other models with different specifications (e.g. 
with more or fewer control variables; inclusion of different combinations of variables 
measured in different ways) are not reported for brevity. They can be available upon 
request. 
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level of democratic satisfaction.  Second, economic engagement of the government 
is negatively associated with democratic satisfaction.  Third, more important to our 
theory, the statistical significance of the interaction term indicates that government 
economic engagement also affects government support through moderating the effect 
of economic perception.  With a higher level of government engagement in the 
economy, the effect of economic perception on government support is greater in 
magnitude. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here.] 
 
Figure 2 presents a marginal effect plot based on estimation of Model 1 for a 
substantively meaningful interpretation of the moderating effect of government 
economic engagement.  The plot shows that, first, an individual who perceived a 
better economic situation is more likely to have a higher level of democratic 
satisfaction, no matter how much the government is engaged in the economy.  Second, 
the upward trend of the solid line in the graph indicates that the positive effect of 
economic prosperity on democratic satisfaction increases in magnitude with a higher 
level of government engagement in the economy.  For instance, when an individual’s 
economic perception changes from being “worse” to “better” in a country where the 
government economic engagement is measured 2, the probability he or she would hold 
a higher level of satisfaction with democracy increases by about 8 percent.  In places 
where the government engagement is measured 4, that probability for the same person 
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would be about 12 percent.  That is, a standard deviation increase of government 
engagement will bring about 50 percent increase ((12-8)/8) in the magnitude of the 
change in probability holding a higher level of satisfaction.  In a country with the 
highest level of state engagement (a standardized value of 10), the increased 
probability is 18%. 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
From Model 2 to Model 5 in Table 1, we conduct a set of analysis replacing the 
composite index of government economic engagement with each of the four 
components (government investment in Model 2, tax rate in Model 3, government 
consumption spending in Model 4, and ratio of government transfer to GDP in Model 
5).  The analyses of the four models show a pattern generally consistent with that of 
Model 1. The interaction term between economic perception and three of the four 
component measures of government engagement is statistically significant (i.e., 
investment, tax, and transfer).  But government consumption has no significant 
moderating effect on the relationship between economic perception and satisfaction 
with democracy, a finding consistent with Alcaniz and Hellwig (2015).  
 
Robustness Check 
In Table 2, we further check the robustness of our findings in various ways, using 
Model 1 in Table 1 as the basis.  First, we change the measurement of the independent 
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variable, economic perception in Model 1 (perception of the present national economy) 
and Model 2 (perception of personal economy).  Second, we change the measurement 
of dependent variable, political support, by using a composite index that measures 
one’s evaluation of government performance in four aspects (Model 3) and evaluation 
of the president’s performance (Model 4), respectively. 
In Model 6, we control for the potential moderating effect of institutional and 
individual factors, both of which are widely suspected in the literature. The first term 
is between economic perception of the national economy and the legislative control of 
the governing party. The inclusion of this term controls for the moderating effect of 
political concentration and, hence, one aspect of clarity of responsibility.  The second 
interactive term is between economic perceptions and individuals’ voting choice in the 
most recent election.  The inclusion of this variable controls for the moderating effect 
of winner/loser status on the relationship between economic perceptions and political 
support. The analysis shows one’ winner/loser status has no moderating effect of the 
effect of economic perceptions.  The macro political institution does have such an 
effect.  In both analyses, the interactive effect between economic perceptions and 
government economic engagement is still statistically significant and positive. 
Finally, we vary model specification by changing the strategy of dealing with time.  
We included dummies of waves in all models presented so far to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity over time.  Alternatively, we fit a three-level model 
(individual, country, and wave) in Model 6. We also limit the sample to one wave with 
the largest number of countries (wave 2008).  Both analyses confirm the positive 
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moderating effect of government economic engagement on the relationship between 
economic perceptions and political support. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The extant literature on the economic basis of political support has paid inadequate 
attention to the moderating effect of varying economic structures on the influence of 
economic perceptions.  We contend that the homogeneity of the state-economy 
relationship cannot be assumed due to the fact that the governments around the world 
have engaged in economic productions and other key economic activities to various 
extent.  The government’s economic engagement constitutes a structural factor that 
predetermines people’s perceptions of the connections between the government and 
the economy.  The government becomes responsible for economic outcomes not only 
due to its competence but also because of its actual presence in the economy and the 
resultant connection with the interests of the citizens in their perception and in reality.  
Therefore, when analyzing the instrumental logic of political support in a comparative 
framework, we should take into consideration the relevance of the economic structure 
as defined by the extent to which the government is involved in the economy. 
The findings of the multilevel analysis indicate that one’s perceptions of economic 
conditions have varying effects on political support, contingent on the level of a 
government’s economic engagement.  The more the government is engaged in the 
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economy, the more likely one is to attribute economic success or failure to the 
government and, hence, to increase the weight of economic conditions in forming 
political support.  This finding is robust against alteration of measurements and 
model specifications. 
The significant moderating effect of government economic engagement adds to 
the understanding of the democratic responsibility of political institutions.  Many 
studies have suspected that, due to individual and institutional constraints, citizens may 
fail to impose necessary negative sanctions on the government offices or officials for 
bad performance of the economy, which is more straightforward for average citizens 
to judge than are other areas of government performance (Anderson 2007).  The 
incompetence in the economy might not lead to office alteration or, consequently, to 
the improvement of governance.  This causes the problem of democratic 
accountability.  Our finding implies that citizens do have a rational basis when it 
comes to the economic basis of political support.  For one thing, they always hold the 
government accountable, to some extent, for perceived economic performance.  For 
another, more importantly, they are more likely to do so when the government is, in 
fact, more involved in the economy.  A more active government role, therefore, is 
associated with greater political responsibilities. 
The amplifying effect of government economic engagement causes a challenge, 
in particular, for developing democracies that are of focus in this study.  On the one 
hand, citizens in developing countries generally expect an active role of the state in the 
economy in order to promote economic development.  On the other hand, the 
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government in those countries also has political motivations to involve itself in the 
economy.  Through delivering a better economy, the government can gain stronger 
support from the citizens for the newly installed democratic regimes.  Nevertheless, 
although it is easy to get involved, it is difficult to maintain consistent growth.  Even 
great competence of government economic management cannot guarantee economic 
success.  The failure to fulfill the economic promise can lead to landslide decline of 
democratic support.  Citizens withdraw support for the government and even for the 
political system not only because they are not satisfied with the economic situation, 
but also because they blame the government for its part.  This constitutes a 
fundamental dilemma for the consolidation of the political support in the new 
democracies in the developing world. 
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Table 1. Estimation of Satisfaction with Democracy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Composite 
index 
Govt. investment Tax rate Govt. consumption Govt. transfer 
 
Individual level 
     
Economic 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 
  Perception (0.021) (0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.016) 
Age 0.00015 0.00017 0.00014 0.00017 0.0000017 
 (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00046) 
Female -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022* -0.020 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Urban -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Education -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Winner 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Aggregate level 
     
Govt. economic -0.093*** -0.0081*** -0.00083 0.038*** -0.087*** 
  engagement (0.0093) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0062) 
Growth rate 0.071*** 0.054*** -0.021*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0033) 
CPI 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.012) 
Econ. openness 0.14*** -0.24*** -0.16*** -0.030** -0.26*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) 
Federalism 0.085*** -0.13*** -0.050** 0.12*** -0.23*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) 
Single 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.83*** 
  party control (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) 
      
Cross-level 
interaction 
     
Econ. percept* 0.034*** 0.0023*** 0.0078*** -0.0010 0.020*** 
  Govt. engage. (0.0044) (0.00066) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0023) 
Level 2 variance 0.11*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 (0.038) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0051) (0.0058) 
N (level 1) 
N (level 2) 
84442 
61 
83805 
60 
84442 
61 
84442 
61 
84442 
61 
AIC 171749.3 170525.4 171770.1 171892.9 171811.6 
BIC 171936.1 170712.1 171957.0 172079.7 171998.5 
Log likelihood -85854 -85242 -85865 -85926 -85885 
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Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is measured as satisfaction with democracy 
2. Results are calculated by multilevel ordered logistic model (gllamm in STATA). 
3. Standard errors in parentheses; Significance: *.05; **.01; ***.001.  
4. Coefficients of waves and cuts are not reported. 
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Figure 1. Levels of government economic engagement over time across countries 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Economic Perceptions on Democratic Satisfaction at all Levels 
of Government Economic Engagement. 
 
 
Note: 
1: The calculation is based on the estimation of Model 1 in Table 1. 
2: Dependent variable is the predicted probability that a person hold a higher level of 
satisfaction with democracy when his or her economic perception changes from “worse” to 
“better. 
3: The two dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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 Model 6 
Present econ. 
perception 
Model 7 
Egocentric econ. 
perception 
Model 8 
Government 
performance 
Model 9 
President 
performance 
Model 10 
More 
interactions 
Model 11 
3 levels 
Model 12 
1 wave 
(2008) 
 
Individual level 
       
Economic 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.41*** 
  Perception (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034) 
Age 0.00054 0.00071 -0.0039*** -0.00066 0.00020 0.000040 0.0011 
 (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00053) (0.00042) (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00080) 
Female 0.014 -0.038*** 0.0052 0.066*** -0.021 -0.022* -0.052** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) 
Urban -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.049*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) 
Education -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.0050*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) 
Winner 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.037) (0.014) (0.025) 
 
Aggregate level 
       
Govt. economic -0.099*** -0.10*** 0.016 -0.026*** 0.046*** -0.010 -0.11*** 
  engagement (0.010) (0.010) (0.065) (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.016) 
Growth rate 0.0045 0.032*** 0.00019 -0.072*** 0.033*** -0.024*** 0.039*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.042) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0048) 
CPI 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.10) (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0078) (0.016) 
Econ. openness -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.15 -0.075*** 0.066*** 0.0022 -0.34*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.23) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) 
Federalism 0.015 -0.39*** -0.27 0.24*** -0.12*** 0.13*** -0.25*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.32) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.039) 
Single 0.39*** 0.0033 -0.29 -0.41*** 0.066 0.35*** -0.082* 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.29) (0.019) (0.049) (0.021) (0.048) 
Cross level 
interaction 
       
Econ. percept.* 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 
  Govt. engage. (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0076) 
Econ. percept.*     0.13***   
  Single party     (0.024)   
Econ. percept.*     -0.00050   
  winner      (0.019)   
Table 2. Estimation of political support 
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Notes: 
1. Results are calculated by multilevel ordered logistic model (gllamm in STATA) except Model 8 (multilevel OLS, xtmixed in STATA). 
2. Standard errors in parentheses; Significance: *.05; **.01; ***.001.  
3. Coefficients of waves and cuts are not reported. Level 3 variance is omitted in Model 11 
Level 2 variance 0.11*** 
(0.038) 
0.12*** 
(0.0041) 
072*** 
(0.066) 
0.22*** 
(0.0053 
0.15*** 
(0.0051) 
0.19*** 
(0.0064) 
0.27*** 
(0.016) 
N (level 1) 
N (level 2) 
85399 
61 
85156 
61 
97344 
61 
95885 
61 
84442 
61 
84442 
61(4) 
27792 
18 
AIC 171700.5 174028.0 444917.7 230373.7 171721.9 171814.7 56814.6 
BIC 171887.6 174215.0 445097.9 230544.2 171927.5 171982.9 56954.6 
Log likelihood -85830 -86993 -222439 -115168 -85838 -85889 -28390 
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Appendix 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Satisfaction with democracy 86448 2.54 0.72 1 4 
Support(specific) 99868 4.53 2.70 0 10 
Support (president) 98326 3.24 0.96 1 5 
Retrospective perceptions 98853 1.79 0.73 1 3 
Present economic perceptions 100081 2.63 0.93 1 5 
Egocentric perceptions 99822 1.92 0.71 1 3 
Age 100593 38.76 15.82 16 99 
Female 100857 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Urban 100858 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Education 100370 8.91 4.57 0 18 
Winner 100858 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Government engagement 100858 3.82 2.08 0 10 
Government investment 99346 25.91 14.00 5.7 58.4 
Top tax rate 100858 26.37 7.78 0 40 
Government consumption 100858 15.40 4.78 7.5 30.9 
Government transfer 100858 5.02 3.95 0.3 16 
GDP growth 100858 4.45 3.47 -4.7 12.1 
CPI 100858 3.50 1.29 2 7.2 
Single-party control 100858 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Economic openness 100858 7.56 0.76 3.7 8.7 
Federalism 100858 0.16 0.37 0 1 
 
Note: Data source of individual-level variables: AmericasBarometer (2006-2012). Data source 
of aggregate variables: Economic Freedom of the World, World Bank, Transparency 
International, and Database of Political Institutions. 
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Appendix 2: Variation of government economic engagement in different aspects 
       
A: Public investment 
 
B: Top marginal tax rate 
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C: Transfer and subsidy 
 
D: Government consumption 
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